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MENGINTEGRASI PENYULITAN BERDASARKAN IDENTIT 
(IBE) DALAM PROTOKOL BOLEH HALA SEMULA  (RRP) 
UNTUK MENINGKATKAN SEKURITI ISYARAT DALAM IPv6 
Mobil 
ABSTRAK 
 
 IPv6 Mobil (Bergerak) membolehkan sesuatu nod dipindahkan daripada satu 
rangkaian ke rangkaian lain tanpa adanya sebarang gangguan komunikasi pada nod. IPv6 
Mobil terdiri daripada Nod Mobil, Nod Sepadan dan Ejen Rumah. Prosedur keautentikan 
di antara nod adalah sangat penting untuk memastikan paket dapat dipindahkan dengan  
selamat (secure packet transfer) serta mobiliti internet yang selamat. Protokol boleh hala 
semula (return routability protocol) merupakan mekanisme yang digunakan dalam IPv6 
Mobil untuk menyediakan nod dengan keautentikan tertentu. Protokol boleh hala semula 
tidak mampu menyediakan perlindungan sepenuhnya di antara nod mobil dan nod sepadan 
dalam IPv6 Mobil. Penceroboh, terutamanya ejen yang bertindak sebagai Man-In-The-
Middle, boleh dengan mudah memintas serta memainkan semula paket, malahan ia juga 
boleh mengubah suai paket di antara kedua-dua nod tersebut. Nod sepadan tidak 
mengetahui sama ada sesuatu paket itu dipindahkan daripada mod mobil yang autentik 
ataupun tidak.  Begitu juga dengan mod mobil, ia juga tidak mengetahui sama ada sesuatu 
paket  itu dipindahkan  daripada mod sepadan yang autentik ataupun penyerang.  Oleh itu, 
tahap kepercayaan di antara mod adalah lemah. IPv6 Mobil tidak akan berfungsi dengan 
baik jika keautentikan di antara kedua-dua nod adalah gagal. Tesis ini mencadangkan 
penggunaan Penyulitan berasas Identiti (Identity-Based Encryption) sebagai suatu cara 
untuk meningkatkan keselamatan dan keautentikan dalam protokol boleh hala semula. 
Penyulitan Berdasarkan Identiti adalah mekanisme keselamatan yang memerlukan pihak 
xvii 
 
ketiga (iaitu, Penjana Kunci Persendirian (Private Key Generator)) untuk mengagihkannya. 
Keadaan ini mampu meningkatkan protokol boleh hala semula di antara kedua-dua nod 
mobil bagi membolehkan  keautentikan dan  keselamatan  yang kuat.  Protokol Penyulitan 
Berdasarkan Identiti – boleh hala semula (Return Routability-Identity-Based Encryption, 
RR-IBE) dinilai menggunakan penyemak model keselamatan. protokol (RR-IBE) mampu 
mencegah serangan Man-In-The-Middle pada keselamatan nod dan mencapai  keautentikan 
di antara nod (contoh: nod mobil dan  mod sepadan) berjaya dibangunkan. 
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INTEGRATING IDENTITY-BASED ENCRYPTION (IBE) IN THE 
RETURN ROUTABILITY PROTOCOL (RRP) TO ENHANCE 
SIGNALS SECURITY IN MOBILE IPv6 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Mobile IPv6 allows a node to move from one network to another network without 
any disruption in communication at the node. Mobile IPv6 consists of the Mobile Node, 
the Correspondent Node and the Home Agent. The authentication procedure between 
nodes is very important so as to achieve secure packet transfer and a secure Internet that 
supports mobility. Return Routability Protocol is a mechanism used in Mobile IPv6 to 
provide the nodes with some authentication. The Return Routability Protocol is not 
sufficiently secured so as to provide enough protection between the mobile and the 
correspondent nodes in Mobile IPv6. The attacker, particularly an agent acting as a Man-
In-The-Middle attack, can easily intercept and replay packets and even modify packets 
between the mobile and the correspondent nodes. The correspondent node does not know 
whether a packet has come from a valid mobile node or a malicious node. Similarly, the 
mobile node does not know if the packet has come from a valid correspondent node or an 
attacker. Thus, the level of trust between the nodes is weak/low. The Mobile IPv6 will not 
function properly if the authentication between mobile and correspondent nodes fails. This 
thesis proposes the use of Identity-Based Encryption as a means to enhance security and 
authentication in the Return Routability Protocol. Identity-Based Encryption is a security 
mechanism which requires a third party (i.e. Private Key Generator) to distribute these 
types of keys. The enhancement in the Return Routability Protocol between the mobile and 
the correspondent nodes has resulted in strong authentication and security. The proposed 
Return Routability-Identity-Based Encryption (RR-IBE) protocol was evaluated using the 
xix 
 
CMurphi Security Model Checker. This protocol (RR-IBE) is clearly prevents the Man-In-
The-Middle from attacking the security of the nodes and obtains the authentication 
between the nodes (i.e. the mobile and the correspondent nodes). 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) is the next-generation Internet protocol used 
to overcome the limitation in Internet Protocol Version 4 (IPv4). The IPv6 protocol, 
sometimes called IPNG, solves the problem of the limited number of available IP 
addresses, which has become a significant impediment to the rapid growth of the 
Internet. However, work must be done in the development of this new protocol to 
correct a number of weaknesses inherent in the current Internet protocol, such as a 
failure to provide safety and support for mobile devices that need for automatic 
configuration of network devices and improved Quality of Service (QoS).  
           Currently, mobile networks are a focus of mobility-orientated research. These 
networks are called Mobile IPs, and they have been categorised by the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) in terms of both homogenous and heterogeneous 
networks (Perkins et al., 2003). In 1996, the IETF mapped Mobile IP onto an open 
standard with RFC 2002, which enables users to maintain the same IP address and stay 
in contact when moving between networks. 
Mobile IPv6 [RFC 3375] is the Mobile IP support protocol for IPv6. Its 
specification has been standardised by the IETF to include several security mechanisms, 
such as mobility protocols (Huafei et al., 2004).  
  The Mobile IPv6 protocol is a network layer of IPv6 that allows one node to 
communicate directly with another node. The mobile network allows its user to remain 
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connected while it changes its location to a foreign network. Any IPv6 node can access 
the host if the node supports Mobile IPv6 by defining its home address, regardless of the 
host’s location. The Mobile IPv6 protocol allows a mobile node to seamlessly move 
from one network to another. If the care of Address (CoA) address gets changed when 
the mobile node moves, the Home Address (HoA) remains the same address. 
The main elements comprising Mobile IPv6 are the mobile node (MN), the home 
agent (HA), the correspondent node (CN), the visitor list, the binding update (BU) 
message, the binding error (BRR) message, the binding cache (BC) entry, the request 
registration message and the binding acknowledgment (BA) message. These 
components operate within the mobile network as shown in Figure 1.1 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Mobile IPv6 framework  
        Figure 1.1 shows three routers and three components, namely the HA, the MN 
and the CN. The MN communicates with the CN in two ways: through HA and directly 
with the CN. 
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1.2 Background   
 In Mobile IPv6, the MN in the home network communicates with the CN using 
a static IP address HoA and CoA. Each home network involves the HA, which is in 
charge of sending or receiving messages between the MN and the CN successively.  
When the MN moves to a foreign network, it receives a new IPv6 address, which 
is called CoA. It registers a new IP address in the HA by sending a BU message without 
returning to the foreign agent. In other words, the CN directly communicates with the 
MN even if it moves to another network. It cannot directly connect to the MN, and 
instead, must communicate via the HA is called triangular routing. After it connects with 
the MN using the HAs, it forwards a message to the MN via the IPSec (Internet Protocol 
Security) tunnel to the new location. Afterwards, they exchange messages directly 
between MN and CN is called Route optimization (RO). In the home network, the BU 
message that is sent via the MN to the HA is already protected because it uses the IPSec 
tunnel, as shown in Figure 1.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Exchange messages between MN and HA 
4 
 
 In Figure 1.2, there is no secure tunnel between MN and CN, which means that 
the BU message sent directly by the MN to the CN is not secured because it does not 
pass through the IPSec tunnel. The integrity and authentication between MN and CN is 
essential to ensuring a correct movement of the BU message. In the meantime, IPSec 
tunnels are encapsulated between the MN and HA messages. 
 Methods of securing the BU message between the MN and CN include Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI), Cryptography Generating Address (CGA) and the normal 
Return Routability (RR) Protocol. The normal RR Protocol is a mechanism to secure the 
BU message. This mechanism requires two cookies: Home Test Initiation message 
(HoTI) and Care-of Test Initiation message (CoTI). The normal RR Protocol consists of 
four messages: HoTI, CoTI, Home Test message (HoT) and Care-of Test message 
(CoT). One of the main goals of the normal RR Protocol is to verify the BU message 
between MN and CN (Blanchet, 2002), as illustrated in Figure 1.3. 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
Figure 1.3: Normal RR Protocol mechanism 
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1.3 Problem Statement 
The normal RR Protocol is a secured protocol that is used in Mobile IPv6. 
Securing communications between the MN and the CN can be an inefficient process. 
More specifically, an active intruder can hijack the BU message and change its value. 
This hijack occurs when the intruder sends two cookies to the CN. The CN does not 
know whether these messages are coming from the MN or from one of the intruders. 
This confusion is due to the lack of authentication between the nodes (MN and CN) 
when they need to exchange messages.  
Researchers have studied security between nodes in RO. The RO station protocol 
used to protect the contract between MN and CN is called the normal RR protocol. 
Some researchers have suggested to replace normal RR protocol to new protocols to 
improve  RO security, but others prefer to focus on enhancing the normal RR protocol 
(Kavitha, et al. 2009; Ahmed et al. 2007; Susanto and Kim, 2009; Mehdizadeh et al. 
2008). Despite these researchers’ attempts to enhance the RR protocol, a lack of 
authentication between the MN and CN still exists. A Man-In-The-Middle Attack 
(MITM) can change the data without alerting the other node. In this thesis, a new 
method will be proposed to enhance the security of the normal RR protocol, including 
improving the authentication between nodes when they exchange messages as illustrated 
in Figure 1.4. This method is called RR- Identity-Based Encryption (RR-IBE) protocol. 
The question posed is as follows: “Can RR-IBE protocol achieves better security and 
overcome weak authentication in the normal RR protocol while exchanging messages 
between MN-CN and CN-MN in Mobile IPv6?" 
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Figure 1.4:  Weak security in the normal RR Protocol between MN and CN 
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
Generally, the main objective of this thesis is to achieve security in the RO 
communications in Mobile IPv6. Specifically, these objectives are: 
 To enhance the normal RR Protocol with IBE in order to overcome security 
shortcomings of the existing RO approach in Mobile IPv6. 
 To evaluate the proposed RR-IBE protocol by using the CMurphi model checker. 
1.5 Motivations 
There has been a significant increase in the number of wireless devices. These 
devices need to be in constant contact during transitions this is especially true for laptops 
and mobile devices in relation to satellite navigation. This need is the primary 
motivation behind this research. The second motivation is to better support the continual 
increases in the numbers of users of these devices. A third motivation is to address the 
limitations in the authentication process between nodes when CN receives messages and 
re-sends them without any knowledge about the source. 
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1.6 Scope of the Study 
The transition process in the normal RR Protocol can be broken down into two 
routes. The first is from the MN to the CN through the HA. The second is directly from 
the MN to the CN. Both methods need to be more secure in their transition processes. 
This study will focus on the path between the MN and CN and the security threats of 
MITM who may alter messages as they travel to the other party. The process of 
authentication is essential to ensuring the secure transfer of messages. 
1.7 Contribution of this Thesis 
The main contribution of this thesis involves creative methods of implementing 
IBE for the Mobile IPv6 with normal RR protocol. The goal is to provide secure 
communication and mutual authentication, to prevent MITM and to achieve the security 
and authentication between MN-CN, CN-MN and from HA to CN. 
 
1.8 Organization of this Thesis 
There are six chapters in this thesis. The first chapter introduces the material and 
the problem to be solved and discusses the thesis goals. In addition, motivations and key 
contributions are outlined. In the second chapter, the general background of Mobile IPv6 
is introduced, and related works are discussed. The third chapter presents the proposed 
methodology and research design. In the fourth chapter, explain the proposed work, the 
fifth chapter highlights the evaluation process and related results. The evaluation and 
comparison of our proposed method is then mapped against the results of other works. 
The sixth chapter offers conclusions along with future recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Mobile IPv6 is a version of the Mobile IP. In the network layer, the Mobile IPv6 
protocol allows a node to directly talk with another node. The Mobile IPv6 allows a user 
to remain connected while the user changes his/her location to a foreign network. 
Mobile IPv6 is important in many applications for the military, aircrafts, hospitals, and 
mobile devices, between others. Mobile IPv6 is important because it enables the user to 
stay connected while moving between networks. 
 Mobile IP is based on the concepts of MN, CN and HA, HOA, COA, Collection 
care-of address (CCOA), Binding cache message (BC), Binding request message (BRE), 
Binding error message (BRR), Binding registration message (BR), Binding update 
message (BU), Binding Acknowledgement message (BA), Tunnel, Foreign Agent and 
visitor list (number of MNs in a foreign network). 
 1- Mobile node: This node has two addresses. These are static IP addresses called HoA 
and CoA. HoA is never changed, but CoA does change when the MN moves to a new 
network. When the MN loses its connection or movement, it must immediately tell HA 
its new CoA. 
 2- Correspondent node: This is a node that communicates either directly with the MN 
or through the HA.  
3- Home address: This is a standing IP address that is referred to the MN when it is in 
the home network. 
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 4- Foreign network: This is any new network visited by the MN. 
The primary CoA is the current CoA for the MN. When the MN moves across 
two networks - for example, when each primary CoA moves through two different 
foreign networks - a new CoA1, which is called the primary address, will be obtained. 
However, when the MN roams on the adjacent foreign network B, another CoA2, also 
called primary (the primary address moves from sCoA1 to CoA 2), will be obtained. 
  5- Home agent: This router is located on the home network and it provides services to 
the MN. The HA also receives packets from all of the MN, the CNs and foreign 
networks. Each node has a binding cache message that defines the authentication cache. 
the cache message contains the CoA of the MNs. For each move, HA must update the 
binding cache. 
6- Binding request message: This message is sent by any node to request the current 
location of a MN. 
7- Binding error message: This message tells the node to update its binding cache. The 
BU message is used to declare where the MN is currently located. 
8- Tunnel: A tunnel is used when a packet is sent from a foreign agent to the HA to 
register with a new CoA of the MN, as shown in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1: Tunnelling between the HA and FA in Mobile IPv4 
       In Figure 2.1, the MN A in the foreign network CN (server) sends a message to 
the MN via the HA, then the HA repeats the same thing in the foreign agent via the 
tunnel. After this step, the foreign agent sends a message to the MN A. The MN A 
receives the message and forwards it again to the foreign agent, which will send it 
directly to the CN without returning to the HA. 
The Mobile IPv6 works when the MN sends both HoA and CoA messages via 
the IPSec to the HA and tot CN. The HA receives an encapsulation message from the 
MN and re-capsulates it, so that it can be sent to the CN. The path between the HA and 
MN is secured by the IPSec tunnel, as the end-to-end framework is secured by IPv6. 
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However, MN can send the packet directly to the CN. The path between these two is not 
secured by the IPSec tunnel, as illustrated in Figure 2.2.  
Figure 2.2: A message transmission in Mobile IPv6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: The CN and the MN exchanging messages between different networks 
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        As shown in Figure 2.3, when both the MN and the CN communicate with the 
foreign network, the MN sends a registration message to the HA by sending a BU 
message. 
2.2 Mobility header: 
The mobility header contains the following: payload prototype, Header Len, MH 
type, Reserved, checksum, and message (Li et al. 2009), as shown in Figure 2.4. The 
mobility header features a subsection that contains other headers, as described in (Li et 
al. 2009; koodli and Perkins, 2007; Soliman, 2004; Stojmenovic, 2002).  
Payload Header Len MH Type Reserved 
Checksum 
Message  
 
Figure 2.4: Mobility Header 
2.2.1 Binding Update Message  
A BU message is used by the MN when it switches to another network to register 
its current location. The BU message is also used for transport between the CN and the 
MN to update the BC entry. The MN on the home network sends the BU message in two 
ways. First, it sends this message directly from the MN to the CN without IPSec 
tunnelling. Second, when the transmission of this message occurs from the HA to the 
CN, it is moved via the IPSec tunnel between the MN and the HA.  
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0                                                                          15 16                                                                                31 
Sequence number 
Lifetime Reserved K L H A
Mobility option 
 
Figure 2.5: Binding Update message 
 
           As shown in Figure 2.5, the BU message contains four fields and four flags. The 
first field is the sequence number field, which contains a sequence number. The second 
field is the reserved field. The third field is the lifetime field, which is what binds the 
information. The fourth field is the mobility header, which consists of a set of messages. 
Table 2.1 illustrates the four flags. 
Table 2.1:  Binding update message flags 
Flags Description 
A Requires binding acknowledgment to respond to the binding update message 
H Home registration 
L Link-local address compatibility 
K Key management mobility 
 
The BU message is protected between the HAs and MNs because it is usually 
processed through the IPSec: 
 In the BU message, the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) encapsulation and 
the BA between HA and MN must be used and efficiently supported. 
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 In the HoTI, the ESP encapsulation between HA and MN must also be used and 
efficiently supported. 
 In the ICMPv6, the prefix discovery is considered the basis of the ESP’s 
encapsulation use and support. 
 To maintain and protect the authenticity of Mobile Prefix Solicitations and 
Advertisements, an IPSec security association must be used by the HA and the 
MN. Accordingly, the IPv6 end-to-end security is the basis of this usage. 
 Connectionless integrity, optional anti-replay security and data origin 
authentication is provided. The ESP header is used and supported by both MN 
and HA. This action is performed with a non-null payload authentication 
algorithm in the transport mode. 
2.2.2 Binding Acknowledgment message  
The Binding Acknowledgment (BA) message sends effective BU messages to 
the HA or the CN. The source address for this binding is in either the HA or the CN, and 
the destination address is the CoA of MN. This message contains the MAC, the 
sequence number and the status. 
          In Figure 2.6, the BA message contains five fields and one flag. The first field is 
the status, which is the definite outcome of the received BU message. The second field is 
the reserved field. The third field is the sequence number, which indicates the number of 
copies that contain the latest BU message and the latest sequence number when MN 
sends the BU message, which is sent by MN once it moves to another network. The 
lifetime is the fourth field, which is used for binding the information. The fifth field is 
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the mobility header. The flag (K) is the key to management mobility, which follows 
directly after the status. 
0                                                                 15    16                                                                             31 
Reserved K Status 
Lifetime Sequence number 
Mobility option 
 
Figure 2.6: Binding Acknowledgment Message 
 
2.2.3 Updating Binding Caches 
Before the CN sends any message to the MN, it conducts operations such as 
checking the BC’s entry. The CN immediately sends a CoA message to the MN when it 
locates the BC entry. The HA receives a datagram from the CN and forwards it to the 
MN via the IPSec tunnel. At the same time, the HA sends an authenticated BU message 
to CN to inform it of MN’s current location. Hence, every binding has a lifetime, 
especially the BU message, as shown in Figure 2.7. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Steps of updating the binding cache 
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In Figure 2.7, the CN sends packets to the HA in the home network. Then, the 
HA sends an authentication BU message that in turn delivers packets to the foreign 
agent. The MN then receives packets from the foreign agent. Finally, a communication 
link is established between the MN and the CN. 
2.2.4 Binding Error Message (BERR) 
The BERR reports errors in a BU message as shown in Figure 2.8, which is 
normally sent by a CN.  
        0                                              15    16                                                               31      
        Reserved          Status 
…………………...……………………………………………………………………………… 
Home address 
……………..…………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Mobility option 
 
Figure 2.8: Binding error message 
 
Some mobility messages can contain mobility message options. The following 
options (Johnson et al. 2004; Li et al. 2009) are defined: 
1-The Pad1 option: 
          The Pad1 option is used when one byte of padding meets the partial requirements 
of one or more mobility options, upon which a padding signal is inserted (Li et al. 2009) 
as shown in Figure 2.9. 
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0                                  15  16                                                 31 
Type=0 
 
Figure 2.9:  Pad1 option 
 
2-The PadN option: 
       The PadN option uses two or more bytes of padding. This option meets certain 
requirements related to the mobility option (Li et al. 2009), as shown in Figure 2.10. 
                     0                                    15 16                                                   31          
 
Type=1 Option Length  
 
 
Figure 2.10: PadN option 
 
2.2.5 Binding Refresh advice option  
The Binding Refresh (BR) advice option is used to recommend that a portion of 
the BU message update the binding information. The binding refresh advice option uses 
BA sent from HA to MN, and it determines the amount of time before MN sends a new 
registration. The option is shown in Figure 2.11. 
0                                                        15 16                                                                       31                                                                      
 
 
Figure 2.11: Binding Refresh Advice option 
Length=2 Type=2 
Refresh interval 
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2.2.6 Alternate Care-of-Address Option 
The alternate CoA option uses two case scenarios with BU messages. In the first 
scenario, the MN needs to a static address (HoA) to any nodes in the home network. The 
second option is to save or protect the CoA information over the path.  In the home 
registration (home network), the BU message must be protected by IPSec between MN 
and HA. The source address in IPv6 always uses CoA, as shown in Figure 2.12.    
            0                                                15 16                                                                   31                                      
Length=16 Type=3 
..................................................................................................................................................... 
Alternate CoA 
…………………………………………………………………………………………..……. 
 
Figure 2.12:  Alternate CoA option 
2.2.7 Binding Authorisation Data Option  
The binding authorisation data option is used to store a hash value computed for 
the BA message and the BU message. This option includes cryptography information 
(e.g., the secret key (Kcn)), as shown in Figure 2.13. 
                  0                                                    15 16                                                    31                             
Length=12 Type=5 
…………………………………………………………………................ 
Authentication
................................................................................................................... 
                          
Figure 2.13: Binding Authorisation Data Option 
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Nonce Indices Option 
 The Nonce Indices option is used with the binding authentication data option 
because it needs to determine the binding key. This option is shown in Figure 2.14. 
0                                                       15 16                                                                  31      
                  
 
Figure 2.14: Nonce Indices option 
 
2.3 Mobile IP Stages. 
2.3.1 Agent Discovery stage  
A MN is discovered by the home network or the foreign network as part of the 
agent discovery stage. By using the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) and 
internet Router Discovery Protocol (IRDP), HA and the foreign agent will send an 
advertised message to the MN, as shown in Figure 2.15. This action is performed by 
leasing the mobile IP extension. MNs are known as the existing point of attachment for 
these advertising messages. If the MN cannot obtain these messages, it might request 
that the HA or the foreign agent send an advertisement after receiving a solicitation 
message, as shown in Figure 2.16. These types of server agent may be identified by the 
MN.  
 
 
Length=4 Type=4 
Care-of Nonce Index Home Nonce Index 
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Figure 2.15: HA or FA sends advertisementmessage to MN 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.16: The MN begins sending a solicitation message to receive an advertisement message 
from the HA or from the foreign agent 
 
2.3.2 Registration stage 
An MN changes its IP address when it moves to another network. At each move, 
it gets a new CoA that requires registration through the HA. The MN sends a registration 
request message to the HA through the foreign agent (FA) in Mobile IPv4, as shown in 
Figure 2.17. However, in Mobile IPv6, the same message is sent directly to the HA 
without passing through the FA, as shown in Figure 2.18, to register its CoA (current 
location). The registration request message that is sent by the MN to the HA is called the 
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BU message. To successfully deliver packets to and from the MN, the registration 
message should be authenticated. The HA sends a registration reply message to the 
foreign agent or directly to the MN. The Registration message is requested by tunnelling 
between the HA and the FA. Before the time expires, the MN should register its current 
location (i.e., in the FA or the HA of Mobile IPv4). After this step, the HA and the FA 
update the binding cache and visitor list entry for the FA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.17: The MN sends a registration request message to HA via a FA in Mobile IPv4 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.18: The MN directly registers its current location through the HA in Mobile IPv6 
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2.3.3 Tunnelling stage 
In the tunnelling stage, one end of the secured tunnel encapsulates the data 
packets and the other end of the tunnel is de-capsulated; this occurs when the CN sends 
packets via the HA to the MN. If the MN is at the home network, the HA will receive 
the packets and encapsulate them after they have been forwarded to the MN via the 
IPSec tunnel.  
When the MN is away, the CN sends packets to the HA, which then encapsulates 
the packets and sends them to the foreign agent. The FA de-capsulates the packets and 
sends them to the MN, as shown in Figure 2.19. The MN uses the HA when the packets 
are sent to the FA. This agent encapsulates the data packets, then sends them to the HA 
via tunnelling The HA delivers the packets to the CN after they have been de-capsulated, 
as shown in Figure 2.20. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.19: The CN starts to send packets to MN on the foreign network 
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Figure 2.20: The MN sends packets to CN via foreign network 
2.3.4 Smooth Handoff 
When the MN moves from the home network to the foreign network, it receives 
a new IP address. The MN registers the request message IP address in the HA either via 
the FA or directly using a CCoA. When the MN moves to a new foreign network, it 
receives gets a new CoA that is different from the previous one. The MN then informs 
the previous foreign agent about its current location, using a process that is called a 
smooth handoff. These handoffs are provided to notify the previous FA about the new 
location of the mobility binding (Kavitha et al. 2009). The HA sends a BU message to 
the MN in the old location before it knows about the movement of the MN. The FA 
sends a BERR message to the HA to announce that the MN is not available.  
A new FA is registered with the previous FA by sending a BU message. When 
the CN communicates with the MN in the foreign network, it sends packets to the HA, 
before forwarding BU message to the first FA. The first FA then sends these packets to a 
new FA and then agent forwards them to the MN. Thereafter, MN replays the message 
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in the same way. Thus the CN communicates directly with the MN in the new location, 
as shown in Figure 2.21.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.21: Basic Smooth Handoffs under Mobile IPv4 
Figure 2.21 shows three agents: the HA, the previous agent, the new FA and one 
node (CN). The CN sends packets to the previous foreign agent via the MN. The 
previous FA sends a BERR message for the HA to require that the MN move into 
another foreign network. A new foreign agent sends a BU message to the previous 
foreign agent to announce a new available CoA. Afterwards, it replays to the BA a 
message for the new FA. The previous foreign agent sends to the HA a binding request 
